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INTRODUCTION 
This is a Will Contest proceeding arising out of the 
Decedent's execution of two (2) separate testamentary documents, 
the first a 1964 will executed in California, and the second, 
a will dated May 19, 1975, executed in Cedar City, Utah. The 
earlier California will left the Decedent's entire estate to 
his two (2) brothers, Thomas and Melvin Thorley, both residents 
of California. The Utah will executed shortly before death 
left the entire estate to the Decedent's third brother William 
10 R. Thorley, a resident of Utah. At the date of death, the 
11 Decedent left the vast majority of his assets in California. 
12 For thirty (30) years prior to death, except for the last 
'13 six (6) months of his life, the Decedent resided in Escondido, 
'14 California. During the remaining six (6) months of his life, 
15 he lived with his brother William in the latter's residence 
16 in Cedar City, Utah until he died on December 21, 1975. 
17 The undisputed facts of the case establish that within two 
18 (2) days the Decedent's removal from Escondido, California to 
19 Ccddr City, Utah on Sunday, May 18, 1975, his brother and sole 
20 beneficiary William R. Thorley, Respondent in this action, typed 
21 a will which left everything to himself. This will was executed 
22 and witnessed the same day. On the third day, May 19, 1975, 
23 Respondent contacted an attorney, Orville Isom, attorney of 
24 record in this action, to draft a will with the same provisions 
25 ilrid appointing himself executor. The Decedent never saw the 
16 atto1nc•y prior to the attorney's drafting the will but spoke 
: ,, l11m briefly on the phone that same day. This will was brought 
1 
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2"I 
by the attorney and his wife to the Respondent's residencet 
same day for the Decedent's signature. 
The Respondent was present in the room during the enti~ 
period of time that Decedent spoke with "his attorney" and r 
mained in the room until the Decedent executed the will. 
I 
At the time of his execution of the will, the Decedent~\ 
! a physically weakened condition following the trip from Call: 
to Utah and was described by his physician as "weak and emac: 
Lester Thorley was also suffering from an incurable form of 
cancer with a limited time to live. He was in a mentally de·I 
pressed state and allegedly his will became sublimated to tli 
of Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Petition for Probate was filed by Respondent inr 
District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, on December 
1975. 
2. After a Concest to the will was first filed by Resper 
in California, and on February 2, 1976, the Appellant, Thoma: 
Thorley, filed a Contest to the Petition to Probate in Iron I 
county. I 
I 
3. On or about October 4, 1976, Thomas J. Thorley filecl 
Contest after Probate and the Appellant pursued this litigat,j 
for over a year thereafter, conducting discovery, taking dep' 
si tions, i,n anticipation of trial. Designation of Record, pg I 
4. On November 10, 1976, a Motion was mudc by R('spondc~' 1 
have a preliminary trial on issue of domicile. 
Record on Appeal, Page 2 ) . 
2 
10 
11 
12 
' ~ 13 
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5. On November 19, 1976, a Demand for Jury Trial on all 
issues was made and filed in the District Court. (Designation 
of Record on Appeal, Page 3 1 • See, P & As (Page 5). 
6. On the 23rd day of November, 1975, a Motion to Stay 
Proceedings or, in the alternative, for a Change of Venue and 
a Motion to have the matter of domicile resolved by way of 
trial by jury was filed in the District Court by the Appellant. 
Points and Authorities in Support of this latter motion was 
filed on or about December 15, 1976. (Designation of Record on 
10 Appeal, Page 9 ) . 
11 These Motions were subsequently taken off calendar (Designa-
12 tion of Record on Appeal, Page 34) and continued until finally 
' ~ 13 set down for hearing on March 8, 1977, to be immediately fol-
14 lowed by a trial on the merits. (Designation of Record on Appeal, 
·15 Page 9, 10). 
16 Notice of this Motion and of the trial, however, arrived 
17 February 28, 1976, less than ten (10) days before the trial 
18 and a Motion for Continuance was filed. (Designation of Record 
19 on Appeal, PagE 11) . 
20 7. On March 8, 1977, counsel for Appellant appeared as 
21 ordered for a hearing on the Motions only to find a Pro Tern 
12 Judge unwilling to consider the matters previously set. The 
23 matters were thereafter rescheduled for hearing on May 23, 
24 1977, to be immediately followed by trial on the merits. 
l5 (Designation of Record on Appeal, Page 12). Notice of this 
26 trial date indicates that an advisory jury only would be 
., 
" sol~ct0d to hear the matter of domicile. This notice was mailed 
3 
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the 29th day of March, 1977, affording counsel almost thirt· 
i I 
days notice. 
8. On May 23, 1977, the motion for a trial by jury as 
opposed to an advisory jury on the domicile issue was hea~ 
denied. After a four (4) day trial, the jury returned the 
' 
Special Interrogatories and the Court entered its Order that i 
the Decedent was domiciled in the State of Utah on the date 
his death. (Designation of Record on Appeal, Pages 17-18), I 
9. After the trial on domicile and on May 27, 1977, atr. 10 
on the merits was taken off calendar when the District Court: 11 
became aware that its failure to admonish the jurors had resu. 11 
in certain jurors discussing the issues amongst themselves. 13 
No trial date was set at that time by the District Court and 14 
counsel was advised that an appropriate trial notice wo~d~ IB 
mailed out in due course. 16 
10. On or about June 7, 1977, Points and Authoritieswer:, 17 
filed in Support of Change of Venue Motion (Designation of Rct 18 
on Appeal, Page l:>)J based on certain matters that had develop1 19 
as a result of the previous trial. I 10 
I 
11. On or about June 17, 1977, a Petition for d I 11 Interme 1°1 
Appeal was filed in the Supreme Court to request review of tr: 12 
i 13 denial of pre-trial Motions. (Designation of Record on Appec1 
Pages 19-20). 
12. On June 17, 1977, eleven (11) days before the da~ 
for trial, Notice wets metiled out by the District Cuurl a<lvis: 
that on June 28, 1977, the trial on the merits of the Will 
Contest would be heard. (Designation of Record on AppcJl, 
4 
14 
15 
16 
,, 
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21). This Notice was received on June 20, 1977, eight (8) 
days before trial. Prior to that and on June 13, 1977, 
California counsel was advised by telephone through Utah co-
counsel Mr. Michael Park of the Court's Order. 
13. On the day before trial, June 27, 1977, the Utah 
Supreme Court denied the Appellant's Petition. 
Record on Appeal, Page 22) . 
(Designation of 
14. On June 28, 1977, pursuant to the Court's Order, the 
Appellant appeared by counsel in the District Court. At that 
10 time, a request was made that the Court, in view of recently 
11 discovered facts resulting from the former trial, change venue 
11 on the strong probability that local bias and prejudice existing 
13 in favor of Respondent William R. Thorley would prevent a fair 
14 trial. 
15 15. In addition, a Motion for a short two-week continuance 
16 of the trial date was made so as to allow counsel in view of the 
17 brief trial notice received and the particular need for time, to 
18 arrange each of the witnesses from the State of California to be 
19 present in Iron County, Utah to testify. These witnesses totalled 
m at least seven (7). 
11 
11 
13 
24 
15 
16 
,, 
16. The Motion for continuance was also based on the 
Supreme Court's denial of the Petition for an Intermediate 
Appeal the day before. (Designation of Record on Appeal, Page22o 
If granted, the Interlocutory Appeal would not only have stayed 
the tri0l court proceedings, but would also have alleviated 
tlvc cx1J''ltse <rnd necessity of producing the witnesses outlined 
;_ii", r_. 'l'he Motion for Continuance along with the Motion for 
5 
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Change of Venue was denied and the Appellant ordered to go 
forward with the trial by order of the Court on June 28, 10: 
(Designation of Record on Appeal, Page 23). 
17. Without the availability of witnesses and with the 
burden of going forward, the Appellant herein respectfully 
advised the Court that it had no choice but to withdraw enb ·
1 
from any further proceedings. 
18. On June 29, 1977, in an uncontested proceeding, thel 
Court admitted the will to Probate and dismissed the Contes: I 
entering Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Designatil 
e 
of Record on Appeal, Page 24). j 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE FAILURE OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO 
GRANT A TWO-WEEK CONTINllANCE OF THE 
TRIAL DATE RESULTED IN A DEPRIVATION 
OF THE APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
AND AMOUNTED TO AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitutlc: 
Section 1, and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitutioo: 
vides that judicial power must be exercised in conformance wq 
due process of law. "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
1 As stated by the Court in Jensen v. Union Pacific Ry·~· 
1 
Utah 253, 21 p. 994, due process of law comes from the Great 
Charter and is synonymous with "law of the land". It means~ 
a party shall have his day in court. 
In the Christiansen v. Harris case, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 
the Court set forth the essentials of due process as, inter 
6 
rd 
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ar> irtc1uiry into the merits of the question by a competent body, 
notice to the person and the time at which such person should 
appear, and fair opportunity to submit evidence and cross-
examine witnesses. Each of these means, which have as their 
S " pu tpose, according to the Court, the protection and enforcement 
10 
11 
11 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
c: 18 
19 
lij 10 
11 
12 
J 13 
- I 
t 14 
d 15 
! 
~5 
of human rights, have the same basic requirements, whether the 
case involves a criminal or civil proceeding. 
The words, "life, liberty, and property" as embraced within 
the due process clause are to be taken in their broadest sense 
as indicative of the three (3) great subdivisions of all civil 
rights. McGrew v. Industrial Comm., 96 U. 203, 85 P. 2d 608. 
Thus, "property" is the right of any person to possess, use, 
·~njoy or dispose of a thing, and embraces all valuable interests 
which a man may possess outside of himself. It is not confined 
to mere tangibles, but extends to every species of vested right. 
McGrew v. Ind. Comm., supra. 
In this case, the Appellant, contestant below, is heir to 
the Estate of Lester R. Thorley and has by virtue of this interest 
the right to a portion of the assets of the Estate in the event 
he is able to prove the allegations of his Contest and thereby 
declare the later Utah will invalid. It is a right which 
therefore demands the rigors of due process. 
While a trial court is apparently imbued with discretion to 
mandge its trial calendar and docket cases for trial, it may not 
abuse that discretion where the facts plainly show that, despite 
' due di.liycnce exercised by counsel for Appellant, the notice of 
lri<1J wct:o insufficient C.o make the necessary arrangements. As 
7 
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indicated above, the District Court on May 27, 1977 took 
2 calendar its scheduled trial on the merits with the assu~ 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
;-
5 14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
l ':i 
2.0 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
that reasonable notice would be afforded of the new trial 
The Court was well aware at that time, by virtue of a pr 
vious four-day jury trial involving much of the same test~~ 
that would support a trial on the merits, that the whole 
prosecution was based on witnesses that would have to be trc 
ported from southern California to southern Utah, a journey 
which takes a minimum eight (8) hour automobile drive or an 10 
almost equally gruelling airline schedule with no direct fllcl 11 
'• 
into Parowan or Cedar City, Utah from San Diego, California. ~ 11 fl 
i( 
These witnesses included among others, the Decedent's 113 
long-time treating physician practicing in San Diego, one ps:: 14 
atric expert also practicing in San Diego, two lay wi tnessesl! 15 
residing in North San Diego County who had contact with the l 16 
Decedent shortly before he moved to Cedar City with Responder,. 17 
and the Contestant and his immediate 
Claire Thorley, who was and still is 
family, including his >::t 18 
suffering from a severe 19 
crippling case of rheumatoid arthritis and who because of su 10 
a problem, would need additional time to consult with a phyd 11 
obtain necessary medications, and recouperate from her prevt".J 11 
journey to Cedar City during the week long trial ending M~ U 
1977. H 
All that was requested of the trial court was two (2) 15 
to make these necessary arrangements. Prior to trial, cour:s· 16 
for Appellant had taken the precaution of deposing eaci ,,f 
witnesses, except his own expert in the event of their una 
8 
• 
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abiljty. Dut this Court is well familiar with the loss of effec-
tivcncss generated by reading a deposition transcript to the 
jury. See Beiras v. Johnson, 13 U. 2d 269, 383 P. 2d 375, 378 
(1969) . 
This request by Appellant was precipitated in part by a 
written notice from the Court mailed to counsel on June 17, 1977 
only eleven (11) days before the date assigned for trial, June 28, 
1977. Verbal notice was received on June 13, 1977 but again this 
was not sufficient time to make all the necessary arrangements. 
The requested continuance was also based on the fact that 
Appellant was still awaiting the decision of the Supreme Court 
on a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal which was filed with the 
Supreme Court on June 17, 1977. If granted, the Order would have 
14 stayed the trial court proceedings. The Petition was filed from 
the Court's Orders of May 27, 1977 denying a right to trial by 
16 jury 0nd denying change of venue. The decision denying the 
17 Petition was not rendered until the day before trial was to 
18 commence, or on June 27, 1977. 
19 This Notice of trial was particularly surprising to counsel 
2U for Appellant in view of the previous trial notice which gave 
·~ 21 almost thirty (30) days to make necessary arrangements. This was 
the notice referred to in Paragraph 7 of the "Statement of Facts" 
23 
above. 
21 The Motion for Continuance also advised the Court of pending 
25 ,, litigution in the State of California and of that Court's recent, 
16 
,,, 1977 decision removing a prior Stay Order, finding that 
I'' , llis Lrict Court of Iron County had indeed failed to accord the 
9 
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3 
Appellant minimum due process. 
Despite what has been summarized above, the trial court 
1 
the motion and ordered the case to proceed to trial, witneso 
4 or not. Inasmuch as the Appellant had the burden of going 
: forward with the evidence, it was le ft with no alternative L 
0 ;I to wi thdraP in silent resignation to the Court's decree. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
~ 12 
-
"' ~: 13 
~ 
f: 14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 'I 
25 
26 
27 
In Bieras v. Johnson, 13 U. 2d 269, 372 P. 2d 375 (1962) 
court held the trial court abused its discretion in failinc -
~ i 
accord plaintiff's counsel a five-week continuance despi~tj 
court's recognition that "some hardship [would have resulted 
the Defendants and others, (Id at 378). In so findi:. 
Court held that the relative significance of these facts die: 
overshadow the potential loss to the Plaintiff who was unable 
attend due to medical incapacity. 
Just as the Court in Beiras found the Plain tiff's testicc: 
to be essential to the case there are equally compelling reo:. 
in a more complicated will contest proceeding for affording r 
opportunity to produce the testimony of Appellant's out-of-st: 
witnesses. 
Thus, it is a well known fact that the Decedent was a reJ 
living a miserly existence while at all times firecely proc'.' 1 
ing his independence. The only people he had contact wi~ j 
California immediately before his removal 
physician, Dr. Warren Jacobs, his brother 
were his treating 
and Appellant, Tnc:I 
Thorley, Appellant's wife, Claire Thorley, Thomas Thorl.e~" 
the Decedent's residence home manager, Mrs. Patricia enc·' 
Decedent's trailer park manager, Mr. Robert Oscar Charron, 
10 
• 
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The Decedent ha~l no immediate family, was never married, was 
retir2d and aged, 81 years, and never associated with or be-
friended anyone aside from those above-mentioned while he resided 
in E2condido, California. 
5 i As such, their testimony concerning his physical and mental 
10 
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status are vitally important. Coupled with the Supreme Court's 
r~jection the previous day of the Intermediate Appeal, and the 
difficulties of arranging to transport these witnesses from 
California on such brief notice, called for the Court's exercise 
of its discretion to grant the brief two-week continuance as 
requested. No prejudice inured to Respondent as a result of this 
brief delay. II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CHANGE 
THE PLACE OF TRIAL WHERE A STRONG 
PROBABILITY OF JURY BIAS AND PREJUDICE 
EXISTED IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT. 
On or about June 10, 1977, Points and Authorities in Support 
of a Motion to Change Venue or the place of trial was filed in 
the District Court, a true and correct copy of that has been 
designated on Page 57 of the Designation of Record on Appeal. 
The Utah Judicial Code §78-13-9 provides the grounds upon 
which this Motion may be granted. In relevant part that statute 
provides: 
"The court may, on motion, change the place of 
trial in the following cases: 
(2) When there is reason to believe that an 
inwart.ial trial cannot be had in the county, city 
01 precinct designated in the complaint. 
r_~) lvl1en. . the ends of justice would be pro-
;iutcd by tl12 change. 
11 
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In Anderson v. Johnson, 268 P. 2d 427 (Utah 1951\), the 
held that the change of venue statute_, should be liberally: 
strued particularly when it concerns the right to a fair an,j 
impartial trial. Thus the Court held: 
"The authority of a court to order a change of 
place of trial existed as common law as part of 
its inherent power to insure a fair and impartial 
trial in dispensing justic . . In extension of 
these principals, most states including ours, have 
provided statutes which should be liberally con-
strued to attain their objects. 268 P. 2d 430." 
In further defining the right to a fair and impartial tr_ 
the Court in Anderson held: 
"All laws have to do with the removal of action 
from one local jurisdiction to another for a 
trial have one definite purpose, that is to pro-
mote justice by avoiding local matters of a pre-
judicial nature that might be detrimental to the 
rights of one of the parties. (Emphasis added) 
268 P. 2d at 430." 
The Utah statute as indicated in the compiler's note to 
Section 78-13-9, is identical with the California statu~.~ 
of Civil Procedure §397. In City of Los Angeles v. Pacifici0 
& Tel. Co., 164 Cal. App. 2d 253 (1958), the Court of Appeai 
in California expressed its rationale for employment of the I 
of the statute under similar circumstances: 
" . . . The evident purpose is to guard against 
local prejudices which sometimes exist in favor 
of litigants within a county as against those 
from without and to secure to both parties to a 
suit a trial upon a neutral ground. . Obviously. 
if both parties, whether a defendant be an indi-
vidual or a corporation, are 'within' the same 
county either as a resident or doing business 
therein 'local prejudice' or biases are not like-
ly to exist; and if in a given case there is a 
probability that a disadvantage will result, 
defendant is entitled to invoke the remedy under 
section 397, Code of Civil Procedure, whish 
12 
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provides for a change of venue upon the ground of 
inability to obtain a fair trial." Id at 257. 
This Motion, along with the Motion for a two-week continu-
ance, came on for hearing on June 28, 1977. The Court at that 
hearing was apprised of three (3) affidavits which for want of 
time were not available at the time of the hearing. Nevertheless, 
an offer of proof was made as to the contents of each of those 
affidavits on the record and the Court, after hearing the same, 
ruled that the affidavits may be filed belatedly but that he was 
10 not convinced, based upon the contents of those affidavits, or in 
11 any other matters presented at the time of the hearing, that 
11 there was sufficient basis upon which to invoke the change of 
13 venue statute. 
14 These affidavits have been designated in the Appellant's 
15 Record on Appeal on Page 72. 1 Of particular interest is the 
16 affidavit of one Ion Bonzo, a former juror in the May trial on the 
17 issue of domicile. Mrs. Bonzo had the benefit of four (4) days 
18 of trial and numerous hours of deliberations before the verdict 
19 was reached. This trial was held only one ( 1) month before this 
10 Motion was made and tJ1e matters therein reflected in her affidavit 
11 show without doubt the substantial prejudice inuring to the detri-
11 ment of the ~ppellant as an "outsider", a California domiciliary 
to the benefit of the Respondent, a leading figure in the small 
14 community from which the jury was polled, drawn, and ultimately 
15 
16 Mrs. Bonzo in part testifies in her affidavit as follows: 
u , I / I / Ftnt. J. l\lthough those affidavits were stricken from the 
'record by the District Court, they were reinstated by Order of the 
Sunrcmc Court datec1 December 5, 1977, upon motion of Appellant. 
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"Although at the start, I honestly felt that 
matters of local prejudice and bias as to Mr. 
WILLIAM R. THORLEY and his well-known and 
recognized name and position in this community 
could be set aside, nevertheless, and now 
considering what has gone before me in the 
trial and the jury deliberations, that this was 
an almost impossible task. During our delibera-
tions, for example, matters which were not in-
troduced by the attorneys through their witnesses 
or documents became a part of those deliberations, 
particularly, the aspects of wealth and reputa-
tion of WILLIAM R. THORLEY. 
. I am totally convinced that an impartial 
trial would in all probability be obtained only 
in a county other than Iron County, Utah, which 
draws its jurors from Ceddr City." 
~ 
What could be a greater testament to the veracity of ~I 
!1 ,, 
allegations of bias and prejudice raised in the moving paper;t 
before the trial court than an affidavit of a former juror, J 
person who, by the way, has absolutely no interest in the s~ 
litigation but who as a part of her civic duty and pridec~ 
forward at the last minute to attempt to prevent a similar i· 
justice from reoccurring. 
Next, consider the affidavit of Ada Thorley, the wife off 
Decedent's brother and sister-in-law of each of the parties'. 
this Appeal and to the action below. Mrs. Thorley has resii 
in Cedar City continuously for the past fifty (50) years ~1 
well familiar with both of the parties to this action. 
Thorley testifies in relevant part: 
"WILLIAM THORLEY is married to Bardella Tho~ley 
and together they have raised five children, 
four boys and a girl all of whom now, except 
one, make their home in Cedar City, Utah 
WILLIAM THORLEY is a member and elder in the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints in 
Cedar City, Utah. 
14 
Mrs, 
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Bill is and has been for some time, a member 
of the l>oard of directors of the State Bank 
of Southern Utah, one of the three major 
banks in town. 
Bill also owns and operates the Thorley Cattle 
Company, a company engaged in the cattle and 
sheep business, one of southern Utah's primary 
industries. 
Bill is in his own right a man of wealth and 
is known as such by most adult members of this 
community ... and he is held in high esteem 
and respect by most. 
THOMAS J. THORLEY, on the other hand . is 
not known in this community, does not reside 
here, and does not and has not worked in this 
community." 
Mrs. Thorley concludes under the state of facts that in all 
probability, Appellant herein would be prejudiced if he were to 
have to try this case in Iron County, Utah. 
Lastly, the affidavit of John Rowberry, citizen of Cedar City, 
for 35 years and the person who is familiar with the parties to 
this case. He attests to the substantial land holdings and 
development of Mr. WILLIAM THORLEY in Cedar City, Utah, his rela-
tive position as elder in the church, past member of the bureau 
of land management, and past candidate on the Republican ticket 
for Iron County Supervisor. He, like the other affiants, concludes 
that prejudice would likely result in favor of the Respondent if 
the case were to proceed in Iron County. 
Contrast if you will the total absence of any sworn affidavits 
or statements by the Respondent or anyone on his behalf to rebut 
3ny of the facts or testimony stated in these affidavits. 
~;11ch a trial, it is contended, could have been easily trans-
J, rred to ~n adjoining county, such as Washington County where 
15 
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:! 
the same district judge, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, al; 
presides. Thus, Judge Burns being familiar with the cased 
facts encountered in the former trial, need only have set 
matter down for hearing in an adjoining county without the 
disruption or judicial waste of time normally encountered~ 
changing not only the place of trial but also the presidi~, 
judge. 
The nature of the proceedings is also significant to 
alysis of the Court's determination This case uniquely 
facts which, if proven, would have questioned and indeec 
the integrity of ~:r. William R. Thorley. Such facts as 
i 
I" 
raised in the Complaint and Contest below allege that Willi~-' 
Thorley perpetrated such fraud and undue influence on his d> ,; 
brother, Lester R. Thorley, that any will executed by the l. 
Decedent while he resided with his brother in Cedar City, Ut{ 
was void. The Complaint alleges that William R. Thorley fur1 
prayed upon the frai 1 ties of body and mind of the Deceden':; I 
I 
to cause him to execute the will under the dominant influen: ~ 
his brother. A local jury, under such circumstance, would i:I 
probability favor the defense. 
Nevertheless, in consideration of the above and other 
arguments raised in the Points and Authorities submitted ll 
. J 
support of this Motion, the Court on June 2 8, 19 7 7 by oraer ' 
the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, denied the Motion and funh·'. 
denied the request of counsel to take the matter under 
ment to consider thr; :1bovc uffidavits which were L1t,:1 
the Court. See Order of the Court dated July 12, in 
133 of the Designation of Record on Appeal. 
16 
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., 
III 
THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JlTRY WAS 
LFFECTIVELY DENIED APPELLANT 
BELOW IN FAVOR OF AN ADVISORY 
,1URY. 
5 ,, T.s noteu above in the Statcmr'nt of Facts, Paragraph 6, a Motio1 
t,) resolve the' issue oi domicile by w.1y of a Jury trial was made 
and filed b·/ .\ppellirnt on or etbout Noveff1ber 23, 1975. A Memoran-
dum of Points and Authorities in Su~part of that Motion was 
9 ! 1 submitted at the time referring to Utah Probate Code §75-14-17 
10 requiring all issues of fact joined in probate to be tried in 
11 conformity with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure and 
12 lltah Probate Code §75-14-18 requiring the submission of issues 
: '. 13 of fact to the jury. 
14 '1 Pule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the 
15 right to jury trial, as declared by the Constitution or as 
16 given by statute, shall be preserved to the parties and that 
17 any party may demand a trial by jury of an issue triable of 
18 right by a jury by paying the statutory fee and serving notice 
19 or, the other party in writing. 
10 Demand for Jury was filed with the District Court (Designa-
21 tll'n cf Pccord on Appeal, Paqe 15) und thr necessary fees 
22 posted . 
. ] Pule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure separates the right 
~ 1 to tri~l by a jury from that of a trial by consent or advisory 
25 J'H\' i:1 Uw following respect: 
If 
"'.'.ule 39. Trial by Jury or by the Court. 
17 
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(a) By Jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as 
provide~ in Rule 38 '. the action shal 1. be desianatcd up011 
the register of actions as a JUry action. The trial of 
all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless ... 
(2) the court upon motion or on its own initiative finJs 
that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those iss 
does not exist . 
(b) By the Court. Issues not demanded for trial bv jun 
is provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court : 
(c) Advisory Jury and Trial by Consent. In all actions 
not triable of riqht by a jury the court upon motion or 
on its own initiative may try any issue with an advisocy 
jury. 
The right to a jury trial has been constitutionally guar0• 1 
in the State of Utah. Article I, Section 10. 
The issue of domicile, a preliminary jurisdictional issue, 
necessitated by virtue of the Respondent's demand in the Cou:' 
below and the issue raised in the Contest after Probate filed. 
that Court. Utah Probate Code §75-1-2 in relevant part prov1811 
a will must be proved and letters testamentary granted if.t~, 
Decedent was a resident of the State, in the county in which 
1 had his residence at the time of his death. In Utah, like 
California, residence is synonymous with domicile for pur~e 1 
probate jurisdiction. Estate of Glassford, 114 C.A. 2d 181,. 
20 p. 2d 908. California Probate Code §301 is synonymous with~ 
21 Probate Code §75-1-2. See compiler's note. 
22 Domicile is the location with which for legal purposes a 
23 person is considered to have the most settled and permanent 
connection, the place where he intends to remain and to whic' 24 
26 whenever he is absent he has the intention of returninCJ, but 
26 which the law may assign to him constructively. Domic i lr is 
27 normally the mor0 comprehensive term in that it include:; 1;,. 
-18-
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act of residence and an intention to remain. Restatement, 
Conflict of Law:o, §12 (1934), Volume I Beale, Conflict of Laws, 
§16.2 (1935); Texas v. Florida, 306 u. s. 398, 425-426 (1939). 
In Gardner v. Gardner, 118 U. 496, 222 P.2d 1055, 
the question concerned the domicile between Utah and California 
for purposes of a divorce decree. There at 222 P. 2d at page 67 
the Court held: 
"The question of whether the plaintiff was a 
'actual and bonafide resident' of Cache County 
for the period prescribed by the statute . 
which is raised by the first assignment of error 
is essentially one of fact. Is the evidence 
such that the trial court was required to find 
that by going to and remaining in California for 
two or three weeks, together with the attendant 
circumstances, the parties thereby manifested 
a present intention to live permanently or 
indefinitely in that state? See 17 Am. Jur., 
Domicile, §24, Page 605, and Price v. Price, 
156 Pa. 617, 27 A. 291." (Emphasis added). 
In the Gardner case, the Court in answering that question as 
to domicile, considered the following principles: 
"Certain civil principles should be kept in mind 
in seeking the answer to the stated question. If 
the parties by going to California expected a 
change of actual domicile, then per force they 
thereby ceased to be actual and bonafide resi-
dents of Utah .... The essential fact that 
raises a change of abode to a change of domicile 
is the absence of any intention to live else-
where. Williamson v. Ossenton, 232 U.S. 619, 
58 L. Ed. 758, and Sneed v. Sneed, 14 Ariz. 17, 
123 P. 312. See also 17 Am. Jur., page 607, 
609-610." Id at page 67. 
To the same effect, the Court in Munsee v. Munsee, 12 Utah 2d 
83, 3u3 P. 2d 71 (1961): 
I I 
I 
19 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
3 
4 
5 
G 
7 
B 
9 
·-
10 
:.J 
< 11 
/, 
:;:; 17 
,1 ~ 
" -
; "' 13 
.. 
'~ ~ ,, !-
w 14 
.-: ll: ;: 
·l ~ ~ •·. 15 
" . ;: 
·r. 0 I 16 0 
" L ~ ~ 
:::: 17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
"What we are trying to say is that whether a 
person is 'actual' resident on top of his 
domiciliarity, including, of course, his in-
tention, is a factual matter determinable in 
the first instance at the trial court level." 
The question of domicile whether concerned with proba~ 
jurisdiction or divorce jurisdiction employs the term "resi 
and, since synonymous with domicile, is, under the above~ 
a factual determination to be tried at the first instance~ 
trier of fact, thus invoking the provisions of §78-21-2 oft 
Judicial Code: 
"All questions of fact, where the trial is by 
jury, ... are to be decided by the jury and the 
provisions of Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure that: 'any party may demand a trial by 
jury of an issue triable of right by a jury by 
paying statutory jury fee and serving . . a 
demand in writing.'" 
In Stickle v. Union Pacific R. Co., 251 P. 2d 867 (Utah. 
the Supreme Court expresses the zealously guarded right toa 
jury trial in the following language: 
"In our democratic system, the people are the 
repository of power whence the law is derived; 
from its initiation and creation to its final 
application and enforcement, the law is the 
expression of their will. The functioning of 
a cross-section of the citizenry as a jury is 
the method by which the people express this 
will in the application of law to controversies 
which arise under it. Both are constitutional 
[Constitution of Utah, Article I, §10] and 
statutory [104-23-5, UCA 1943; U.R.C.P. Rule 38] 
provisions assure trial by jury to citizens 
of this State. 
Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arrogate 
to themselves arbitrary and dangerous powers by 
presuming to determine questions of fact which 
litigants have a right to have passed upon by 
juries. Part of the merit of the jury system is 
its safeguarding against such arbitrary power 
in the courts . " 
20 
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The right to a jury trial, unlike the right to an advisory 
jury, is clearly segregated both in statute and in law and the 
right to a jury trial does not mean the right to an advisory 
jury v1hich under the latter system, gives the Court the perogative 
to accept or reject the jury's determination. Thus, Rule 39(c) 
provides: 
"In all actions not triable of right by a jury 
the court upon motion or on its own initiative 
may try any issue with an advisory jury .. 
(Emphasis added) . 
10 In the instant action, a Motion was made in connection with 
11 the court's Order dated March 29, 1977, the Order setting the 
12 matters down for trial including domiciliary hearing to be 
13 followed by a trial on the merits. This Order is designated 
14 on Page 48 of the Designation of Record on Appeal. In 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2b 
relevant part, that Order states: 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above listed 
matter be, and hereby is, set down for hearing 
as to the domiciliary with advisory jury on 
Monday, the 23rd day of May, 1977, to follow 
the hearing on said Motions." 
At the time of the hearing of a Motion for a Jury Trial as 
opposed to an advisory jury, the Court denied the Motion and 
proceeded with the jury acting in an advisory capacity by 
submitting special interrogatories to that jury and thereafter 
accepting the jury's determination which was encompassed within 
the Interlocutory Judgment on jurisdiction. Designation of 
Record on Appeal, Page 80. While the Court in the Interlocutory 
JudcJmen l does not distinguish between an advisory jury and a 
Jlny, it is nevertheless fact that the Court employed the jury 
L 21 
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in the advisory capacity and denied the Appellant th~ right,[ 
., 
jury trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It is requested that for the reasons stated, the judgmen: 
6 be reversed. 
(i DATED: _1¢,p 
1 Respectfully submitted, 
8 HIGGS, FLETCHER & MACK 
I 
'I 9 
DATED:~ 27 1977. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
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The right to a jury trial, unlike the right to an advisory 
jury, is clearly segregated both in statute and in law and the 
right to a jury trial does not mean the right to an advisory 
jury which under the latter system, gives the Court the perogative 
to accept or reject the jury's determination. Thus, Rule 39(c) 
provides: 
"In all actions not triable of right by a jury 
the court upon motion or on its own initiative 
may try any issue with an advisory jury .•• " 
(Emphasis added) . 
10 In the instant action, a Motion was made in connection with 
11 the Court's Order dated March 29, 1977, the Order setting the 
. ; ~ 
12 matters down for trial including domiciliary hearing to be 
13 followed by a trial on the merits. This Order is designated 
14 on Page 48 of the Designation of Record on Appeal. In 
15 
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relevant part, that Order states: 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above listed 
matter be, and hereby is, set down for hearing 
as to the domiciliary with advisory jury on 
Monday, the 23rd day of May, 1977, to follow 
the hearing on said Motions." 
At the time of the hearing of a Motion for a Jury Trial as 
opposed to an advisory jury, the Court denied the Motion and 
proceeded with the jury acting in an advisory capacity by 
submitting special interrogatories to that jury and thereafter 
accepting the jury's determination which was encompassed within 
the Interlocutory Judgment on jurisdiction. Designation of 
Record on Appeal, Page 80. While the Court in the Interlocutory 
Judgment does not distinguish between an advisory jury and a 
jury, it is nevertheless fact that the Court employed the jury 
21 
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in the advisory capacity and denied the Appellant the right 
jury trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It is requested that for the reasons stated, the judgmen 
be reversed. 
DATED: _...:_1¢.J--:.J._...0~---' 19 77. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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